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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To analyse a medical protection
organisation’s database to identify hazards related to
general practice systems for ordering laboratory tests,
managing test results and communicating test result
outcomes to patients. To integrate these data with
other published evidence sources to inform design of a
systems-based conceptual model of related hazards.
Design: A retrospective database analysis.
Setting: General practices in the UK and Ireland.
Participants: 778 UK and Ireland general practices
participating in a medical protection organisation’s
clinical risk self-assessment (CRSA) programme from
January 2008 to December 2014.
Main outcome measures: Proportion of practices
with system risks; categorisation of identified hazards;
most frequently occurring hazards; development of a
conceptual model of hazards; and potential impacts on
health, well-being and organisational performance.
Results: CRSA visits were undertaken to 778 UK and
Ireland general practices of which a range of systems
hazards were recorded across the laboratory test
ordering and results management systems in 647
practices (83.2%). A total of 45 discrete hazard
categories were identified with a mean of 3.6 per
practice (SD=1.94). The most frequently occurring
hazard was the inadequate process for matching test
requests and results received (n=350, 54.1%). Of the
1604 instances where hazards were recorded, the most
frequent was at the ‘postanalytical test stage’ (n=702,
43.8%), followed closely by ‘communication outcomes
issues’ (n=628, 39.1%).
Conclusions: Based on arguably the largest data set
currently available on the subject matter, our study
findings shed new light on the scale and nature of
hazards related to test results handling systems, which
can inform future efforts to research and improve the
design and reliability of these systems.
INTRODUCTION
The ordering of laboratory tests by clinicians
for the purpose of screening, diagnosing and
monitoring patients is a vital and increasing
part of routine primary care worldwide.1
However, growing international evidence
points to the associated clinical risks and
patient harms associated with complex test
results systems.2–7 Multiple, interacting
process steps and personnel are involved,
including ordering tests; tracking and recon-
ciling results with tests ordered; reviewing
and ‘actioning’ the results; and
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ The study reports findings from the analysis of
the Medical Protection Society’s (MPS) organisa-
tional database, which contains arguably the
largest available data set on the hazards asso-
ciated with systems for ordering laboratory tests,
managing results and communicating outcomes
to patients in primary care.
▪ The findings are strengthened because data col-
lected on hazards involved both general practice
teams and external, independent review visits by
trained MPS clinical risk assessment facilitators.
▪ A conceptual model of the hazards associated
with the test ordering and results management
system and their potential impacts on health,
well-being and performance was developed
based on empirical data from this study and
others. This may be useful for informing future
patient safety research, quality improvement and
evaluation efforts.
▪ A failure to collect and cross-tabulate practice
demographic data with risk data was a study
limitation and a missed opportunity in learning
more about the impact of diverse practice demo-
graphic characteristics on the scale and nature of
identified hazards.
▪ Although data from a large number of general
practices across the UK and Ireland were ana-
lysed and will be of wide interest, the findings
may still be open to bias as the vast majority
were contracted members of a single medical
indemnity organisation and may not, therefore,
be representative of general practice
organisations.
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communicating the ﬁndings to patients.8 At every stage,
there is a risk of system failure and the subsequent possi-
bility of patients being unintentionally harmed.9
The design of the test ordering and results handling
process in a single general practice is characterised by its
heterogeneous nature and functioning, which is reﬂect-
ive of a non-deterministic, complex sociotechnical
system.10 The ‘complexity’ is characterised and ampliﬁed
by the interactions and interdependencies between dif-
ferent people (eg, patient, clinicians and administrative
staff communications) and technologies (eg, computer
hardware and software or venipuncture equipment) in
the system.11 12 Although there is clearly a linear work-
ﬂow aspect between taking a blood sample, ordering a
test, managing the test result and then communicating
the ﬁndings to the patient,8 it is not always possible to
accurately anticipate and predict the behaviour of this
type of system even when its functions and properties
are fully known.13
Patient safety research in primary care indicates that
between 15% and 54% of all detected incidents are dir-
ectly related to the systems management of testing
results.14–16 The evidence also demonstrates that existing
support systems are complex, problematic, error prone
and many vary in terms of their reliability and design
quality.17 The consequences include poor follow-up of
test results, missed results of clinical signiﬁcance, failing
to act on results and delays or errors in communicating
the outcomes of results leading to avoidable patient
harms.18–20 The impacts for patients include missed or
delayed diagnosis and treatment causing unnecessary
distress and continued ill health, as well as dissatisfaction
with healthcare and the inconvenience of returning for
appointments and to repeat blood tests.2 14–17 21 22 For
clinicians and the wider practice, there is the possibility
of patient complaints, medicolegal action, breakdowns
in patient relationships, and increases in workload and
time commitments caused by repeating work tasks and
problem solving-related issues due to unreliable and
inefﬁcient systems.17 23 24
Despite the management of the testing and result
communication process being a known clinical risk, pub-
lished empirical evidence of the nature and scale of
what goes wrong and why is very limited, particularly in
the UK and wider European general practice settings
where there is much less research compared with North
America.17 Although much of the patient safety litera-
ture acknowledges many of the threats posed,3 there is
limited detail of those interacting factors that contribute
to suboptimal performance across the system mainly
because topic-speciﬁc research that needs to be under-
taken over time is lacking.17
As part of the LINNEAUS Euro-PC collaboration25 on
patient safety in primary care (box 1), preliminary guid-
ance on the safe management of laboratory-based diag-
nostic tests ordering and results systems was developed
based on the limited research published,
programme-related studies and recent independent
research outcomes.17 A key contributor to the safe guid-
ance development was Medical Protection Society’s
(MPS) risk management programme in the UK and
Ireland. In addition to its core function as an inter-
national medical protection and indemnity organisation
for clinical professionals, MPS also undertakes a clinical
risk self-assessment (CRSA) for individual general prac-
tices as part of membership arrangements,26 or for a fee
for non-members (box 2). The CRSA is an educationally
supportive initiative which involves a visit from a speciﬁc-
ally trained MPS clinical risk assessment facilitator who
reviews, documents and provides feedback on a whole
range of clinical system risks, patient safety issues and
professional requirements across the general practitioner
(GP) workplace, including those related to systems for
the safe management and communication of laboratory
Box 2 Summary of the clinical risk self-assessment
(CRSA) process
CRSA purpose:
▸ To offer an opportunity for all members of the team—general
practitioners, managers, nurses, receptionists and therapists—
to work together, talk openly and develop practical solutions
that promote safer general practice.
CRSA aims to:
▸ Identify potential areas of risk and encourage all members of
the team to develop safer practices
▸ Reduce the likelihood of complaints and claims
▸ Support the practice development plan
▸ Provide useful evidence for appraisal and revalidation
▸ Identify non-compliance with national standards
▸ Improve communication within the team.
CRSA involves:
▸ A previsit questionnaire to ascertain roles and responsibilities
and services provided
▸ A full-day visit by a trained Medical Protection Society (MPS)
risk assessment facilitator, incorporating a half-day multidis-
ciplinary workshop
▸ Confidential exploratory discussion with key members of staff
▸ Completion of a staff patient safety culture survey, which helps
identify the importance of patient safety within the
organisation.
Box 1 About the LINNEAUS Euro-PC collaboration
The LINNEAUS Euro-PC collaboration is a coordination action
funded by the European Union Framework 7 Programme. The
main focus of the coordination action is to build a network of
researchers and practitioners working on patient safety in primary
care in the European Union. Through building a network of
researchers into a pan European network, this coordination action
will extend the current knowledge and experience from countries
where the importance of patient safety is nationally recognised, to
countries where it is less developed, ensure that there is an
appropriate focus on primary care and encourage cooperation and
collaboration for future interventions through large-scale trials
(http://www.linneaus-pc.eu/index.html)
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test results. Most related research thus far has explored
the safety perspectives of patients and GP team
members, observed practice systems, and reported litera-
ture ﬁndings or a method to measure system
safety.1 17 27 From this perspective, the service offered by
the MPS is unique and (given the limited published evi-
dence) potentially provides access to arguably the most
extensive data set available for this important, safety-
critical area of clinical practice.
Against this background, we aimed to identify, analyse
and learn from the MPS organisational database of
hazards speciﬁcally related to practice systems for the
ordering of laboratory test investigations and subsequent
results management and communication processes. We
further aimed to integrate these data with other evi-
dence sources to inform design of a systems-wide con-
ceptual model of related hazards and the potential
impacts on the well-being of people and the practice as
an organisation.
METHODS
Definition and scope of system hazards, risks and
laboratory tests
‘Hazards’ can be deﬁned as a potential source of harm or
adverse health effect on a person or persons.10 28 They
are present in every workplace but more so in complex,
safety-critical industries such as primary healthcare orga-
nisations. A hazard can be viewed as a latent system condi-
tion that will not normally lead to an incident unless it
interacts with other system elements. For example, a
general practice hazard may be a total reliance on
patients to contact the surgery for test results. This would
become a contributory factor in a patient safety incident
if the following interacting system issues occurred: (1)
The patient’s test result is clinically abnormal and indica-
tive of an early stage of serious illness. (2) The patient
fails to contact the practice as requested at the previous
consultation. (3) There is a signiﬁcant delay in the prac-
tice reviewing and ‘actioning’ the test results received.
The goal of this safe system paradigm is to minimise risks
and avoid unwanted but preventable harm events.
Hazard is closely related to and is often used inter-
changeably with the term ‘risk’, although they are differ-
ent concepts. ‘Risk’ can be deﬁned as the likelihood
that a person may be harmed or suffers adverse health
effects if exposed to a hazard.10 28 In this study, the iden-
tiﬁcation of hazards embedded in test results systems
extended beyond the risk consequences for patients and
includes potential impacts on the ‘well-being’ of relatives
and carers as well as the GP team and the performance
of the practice surgery. ‘Well-being’ is deﬁned from a
person perspective as health, safety, comfort, conveni-
ence, satisfaction, interest and enjoyment; and in prac-
tice organisational terms as performance with regard to
productivity, quality, ﬂexibility and effectiveness.29
Given the scope, range and complexity of clinical
investigations that can be ordered by primary care
clinicians, the LINNEAUS Euro-PC collaboration
decided to narrow the study focus to include only
common, high volume biochemistry and haematology
blood test requests (ie, those with short turnaround
times like urea and electrolytes, liver function test, full
blood count)—although it was recognised that the study
ﬁndings and implications would likely apply more widely
to include other investigation processes.
CRSA data collection
The CRSA is a supportive, voluntary improvement
method developed by MPS for its UK and Ireland prac-
tice membership. The purpose is to bring the GP team
together to learn about clinical and organisational risks,
and guide teams to adopt a systems approach to mitigat-
ing or minimising related threats. The process involves a
1-day external visit and review by an experienced and
trained MPS clinical risk assessment facilitator—all facili-
tators have a clinical background and have worked or
currently work in primary care. The facilitator employs a
combination of small group work exercises, and infor-
mal and structured conﬁdential discussions with team
members to identify actual or potential hazards across
the GP work system that may impact on patient safety or
the health and well-being of staff members. It employs a
core standardised approach but takes account of the dif-
fering legislative and primary care structures in each
country’s health system.
The CRSA facilitator undertakes informal interviews—
guided by a standardised proforma—with key members
of the practice team (eg, GP partners, practice manager,
practice nurses and administrative staff) discussing
internal systems and identifying potential hazards
during the discussions and observations made as part of
a ‘think-aloud’ process,30 while also taking contempor-
aneous notes. Additional hazards are identiﬁed by the
team themselves during a multidisciplinary afternoon
workshop. Based on all hazards collated and actions
agreed on, the facilitator generates a report using an
online system containing hazards and recommendations
for each hazard category and a comments/guidance
section, that is, what is the legislation guidance around
this particular hazard or action. A rating system is also
employed for all hazards which gives a combined score
out of 400 for the following four domains: patient safety,
clinical risk, legislation and ﬁnancial risk. Timescales for
recommended interventions or actions for each identi-
ﬁed hazard to be implemented are prioritised as short,
medium or long term. All reports and scoring are inde-
pendently peer reviewed by another risk facilitator with
differences resolved by consensus.
Categorisation of MPS data
A list of 722 documented ‘free-text’ hazards related to
the tests results handling systems previously recorded by
CRSA risk assessment facilitators during visits was gener-
ated from the MPS organisational database. The com-
plete list was carefully read and re-read, coded on an
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iterative basis from which a basic categorisation frame-
work was developed and reﬁned by NH based on
content analysis principles.31 This involved a process of
identifying the same hazards, merging those strongly
related to each other, deleting duplicates and ultimately
reducing the total number until a preliminary list of 45
discrete hazard categories was identiﬁed. One author
( JP) then independently checked the validity of the cat-
egories against the original ‘free-test’ list and coding
data, with any disagreements queried and resolved with
NH.
Thematic analysis of MPS hazards categories and
published evidence
The discrete hazard categories were then jointly
reviewed and analysed by three authors (PB, JP and JM)
to generate agreed ‘high-level’ themes for each func-
tional dimension of the results handling management
system (preanalytical, specimen processing stage (for-
merly ‘analytical’), postanalytical and communication
outcome issues). The system hazards reported in the
published evidence base1 17 that informed the develop-
ment of the aforementioned LINNEAUS Euro-PC safe
guidance was also reviewed. Although this did not add
anything novel to the MPS data set, it provided informa-
tion on risks at the practice organisation and cultural
levels, together with overall impacts on the well-being of
people and the organisation related to poor or inad-
equate system design. This review, analysis and agree-
ment process was achieved by three 4 h, face-to-face
meetings with all of the authors and follow-up electronic
mail discussion until consensus was reached.
Conceptual modelling of system hazards identified
The conceptual model evolved by merging the core
components of two existing theoretical frameworks of
high relevance to this work. The ﬁrst was Hickner et al’s8
generic model of the preanalytic, analytic and postanaly-
tic stages and functions of a diagnostic test ordering and
results management system. The second approach was
Carayon et al’s32 Safety and Engineering Initiative for
Patient Safety (SEIPS) proposed model of human
factors interactions (people, tasks, technology and tools,
environment and organisation) and related outcomes
(eg, the well-being and performance of people and
organisations) for healthcare systems. Key elements of
the SEIPS approach were merged to the generic test
results framework to form the basis of a ‘new’ concep-
tual model. The aforementioned themes generated by
the authors were then mapped onto this ‘new’ model to
describe potential hazards and outcomes associated with
results handling systems. However, we subdivided the
‘postanalytical test stage’ of the system to create a new
end-stage process of ‘communication outcome issues’,
which litigation data and recent research have high-
lighted as an important safety-critical system element
where failures may occur for patients and practices.
RESULTS
CRSA practice visits and proportion with system hazards
identified
A total of 778 CRSA visits to UK and Ireland general
practices were undertaken over the period from January
2008 to December 2014. In 647 practices (83.2%), a
range of hazards were observed and recorded by clinical
risk assessment facilitators that were related to the safe
operation of the test ordering and results management
system. A breakdown of the year of CRSA visit, number
of practices and the proportion with system hazards
identiﬁed is outlined in table 1.
Number of hazard categories, mean number and most
frequently occurring
A total of 45 discrete hazard categories were identiﬁed
which cover the breadth of the laboratory test ordering
and results management system (see online supplemen-
tary appendix 1). The mean number of hazards per
practice was 3.6 (SD=1.94). The most frequently occur-
ring hazard was inadequate processes for matching test
requests and results received (n=350, 54.1%). Other
hazards which occurred in many practices include
informing patients of results but failing to communicate
that the results data set is incomplete (n=195, 30.1%),
and system reliance on patients contacting the practice
for test results (n=166, 25.7%). The frequency of occur-
rence of the 15 most common hazard categories identi-
ﬁed by CRSA facilitators is described in table 2.
In those practices with identiﬁed systems risks, the 45
known hazard categories were recorded on a total of
1604 occasions. A breakdown of the proportion of these
hazard occurrences (subdivided into each of the four
high-level system dimensions) is described in table 3.
Hazards occurred most frequently at the ‘postanalytical
test stage’ (n=702, 43.8%), followed closely by ‘commu-
nication outcomes issues’ (n=628, 39.1%). Therefore, in
Table 1 Proportion of clinical risk self-assessment
(CRSA) practice visits conducted in the UK and Ireland by
year and proportion with test results system risks
highlighted by clinical assessors
CRSA general
practice visits
Proportion of
practices with
identified test
results system
issues
Year (n) (n) (%)
2008 41 34 82.9
2009 136 107 78.7
2010 121 108 88.5
2011 162 138 85.1
2012 58 48 82.7
2013 153 135 88.2
2014 107 77 72.0
Totals 778 647 83.2
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the vast majority of cases, system hazards occur after the
test result arrives back in the practice.
Practice organisation and cultural issues
A number of commonly occurring high-level organisa-
tional and culture risks were identiﬁed mainly from pub-
lished evidence17 but also from the MPS study data.
These were deﬁned as those risks that relate to the
organisation of the whole system. For example, limited
practice leadership commitment to safety; limited oppor-
tunities for necessary staff training; an over reliance on
patients to contact the practice for test results; and lack
of a formal written system protocol that is shared and
understood by the GP team.
Conceptual model of system hazards
The developed conceptual model (ﬁgure 1) is represen-
tative of the test ordering and results handling process
as a complex sociotechnical system.10–12 It describes
(and potentially predicts) how the hazards at the organ-
isational and cultural levels and across the speciﬁc
generic stages of the test results system may interact to
impact on the well-being of people and on practice per-
formance. The model has the potential to be utilised or
adapted by GP teams to prompt reﬂection and discus-
sion around speciﬁc hazards related to different aspects
of the results handling system as a means to facilitate
risk assessment, potential learning and improvement
opportunities as part of the patient safety agenda.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we analysed data on test results manage-
ment systems held in a large medical protection organ-
isational database collected as part of clinical risk
assessments undertaken in general practices throughout
the UK and Ireland. The ﬁndings illustrated the pres-
ence of a signiﬁcant number of system-wide hazards that
may impact on the health, safety and well-being of
patients, but also on the GP team and the practice
organisation. By integrating these data with existing evi-
dence,1 17 we were able to design a conceptual model of
hazards and impacts related to test results systems in
primary care. The model may be useful from a health
services research or implementation science perspective
in studying facilitators, inhibitors and interventions to
improve the safety of test results processes based on
systems thinking.12 33
Arguably the ﬁndings provide a clue for the ﬁrst time
in terms of quantifying the extent to which aspects of
general practice systems for managing test results (more
than 80% of practices in this study) may be at risk of
Table 3 The number and proportion of hazards (n=1604)
identified at each of the four high-level system dimensions
in the UK and Ireland general practices undergoing a
clinical risk self-assessment visit between 2008 and 2014
System dimensions N
Per
cent
Preanalytical stage (eg, inadequate
specimen handling and storage)
209 13.0
Specimen process stage (eg, broken
specimen container)
65 4.0
Postanalytical stage (eg, not acting on
results that require action)
702 43.8
Communication outcome issues
(eg, failure to inform patient)
628 39.1
Total 1604 100.0
Table 2 The top 15 most frequently occurring hazards identified during CRSA visits to general practices by MPS (n=647)
No Hazard category n
Per
cent
1 Inadequate process for matching test requests and results received 350 54.1
2 Inadequate tracking process to check patients attend on request following abnormal results being
received
340 52.5
3 Informing patients of some test results before all results are received 195 30.1
4 System reliance on patients contacting practice for test results 166 25.7
5 Test results not being forwarded to covering GPs in a timely manner (inadequate ‘buddy system’, ie, a
clinical colleague covers the work of a colleague on annual leave or sick leave, etc)
94 14.5
6 Family members and ‘Third Party’ requests for test results 91 14.1
7 Communicating incorrect results 80 12.3
8 Ambiguous and/or unclear instructions given to frontline administrators by GPs to communicate to
patients
78 12.1
9 Front-line administrators asked by patients for test results and to provide addition information/
interpretation
75 11.6
10 Failing to ‘action’ clinically abnormal results received 69 10.7
11 Lack of system standardisation—variation and inconsistency in how GPs review and action test results 61 9.4
12 Lack of a formal protocol describing the overall system 58 8.9
13 No documented record of tests requested to ensure that all tests and results have been reported on 56 8.7
14 Test results not forwarded to the requesting GP/GPs reporting on test results ordered by a colleague 54 8.3
15 Desired action not carried out, that is, due to difficulty contacting the patient or task not being completed 49 7.6
CRSA, clinical risk self-assessment; GP, general practitioner; MAS, Medical Protection Society.
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impacting on the safety, health and well-being of
patients, the GP team and the practice as an organisa-
tion. Although the high ﬁgure may not be surprising
given what we know about patient safety in general prac-
tice,5 it does reinforce the complexity of such systems
and highlights the potential difﬁculties faced by
extremely busy GP teams in coping with everyday work
related to the management of test results. Although it is
previously reported that errors can occur in any of the
multiple steps of the test management process, it is
unclear which stage(s) is the most hazardous from a
general practice perspective.34 Our ﬁndings suggest that
just over 80% of all hazards identiﬁed directly related to
functions in the postanalytical test stage. Arguably, there-
fore, this area may harbour the greatest risks because of
the requirement for high-level clinical decision-making
and more complex communication tasks which may be
difﬁcult to capture in standard protocols—particularly
in terms of the timely follow-up of abnormal results and
communicating test results outcomes to patients.
Previous research using anonymous reporting by clini-
cians found types of system ‘errors’35 that similarly align
with the potential risks identiﬁed in this study, such as in
the workﬂow of results to the clinician, test ordering pro-
cesses and notifying results to patients. However,
whereas Hickner et al found that <10% of errors
reported related to communication outcome issues, just
under 40% of all hazards uncovered in this study were
identiﬁed in this part of the test results system. This
ﬁnding is also supported by a recent UK study by
Litchﬁeld et al36 who found that patients frequently
experienced dissatisfaction with the test results process,
particularly around communication delays and inconsist-
encies in how information was imparted to them. A
clear and accessible protocol for the communication of
results was suggested by patients as a practice improve-
ment method to this problem. Similarly, recent research
has also identiﬁed risks posed around
clinician-to-administrator and administrator-to-patient
communications related to the testing process and the
need to enhance current communication skills for these
groups as another method of making care safer.22 23
Traditional approaches to learning from inadequate
results handling systems by GP teams will highly likely
focus on methods such as clinical audit and signiﬁcant
event analysis. Both are reactive approaches which while
useful also offer a limited and fragmented perspective of
the whole test results management system in that they
tend to focus on ‘end point outcomes’ (eg, number of
test results successfully communicated to patients within
ﬁve working days, or investigating and learning from
why a single test result was lost). Arguably what is also
necessary is to understand the underlying system as a
whole. One retrospective method which attempts this
systems-wide approach is the implementation of a ‘care
bundle’ to measure and monitor basic safe performance
at each high-level stage of the system and direct improve-
ment efforts where necessary.27 It is also argued that pro-
spective hazard analysis methods are necessary in order
to develop a deeper understanding of the intricate func-
tioning of the system and the identiﬁcation of likely
error producing conditions.37 However, there is very
limited evidence that these types of improvement
approaches are being applied to test results
Figure 1 A conceptual model of test ordering and results handling system hazards from a primary care perspective
(GP, general practitioner).
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management systems, probably because of a lack of cap-
acity and capability on the part of GP teams.
A general criticism of current approaches to patient
safety in all healthcare settings is that they may be inad-
equate for understanding system complexity and are
overly focused on issues of reliability, quantifying inci-
dents and performing incident investigations as the
main means of learning about systems of work ‘fail-
ures’.38 The ‘holy grail’ of this safety management
approach is perceived as the absence of incidents (and
therefore harm) or at least their reduction to an ‘accept-
able’ number. In resilience engineering terms, this is
known as a safety-I approach and is perceived as being
limited in gaining insights into the everyday functioning
of complex sociotechnical systems such as those found
in healthcare.39
In this regard, resilience engineering offers a system
perspective of potential interest to safe test results man-
agement. It is deﬁned as the ability of a system to modify
but sustain its functioning before, during and after any
changes whether they were expected or otherwise. It is
interested not only in what goes wrong (failures) but
importantly what goes right (successes). If a system is
resilient, then it is safe—based on the “simple fact that it
is impossible for something to go right and wrong…at
the same time”.13 This is the cornerstone of what is
known as a safety-II approach. From a research and
improvement perspective, an interesting next step might
be to explore this concept of systems resilience and how
taking this type of proactive approach may beneﬁt the
safety management of test result systems.
However, putting aside the philosophical debate over
how best to understand and improve patient safety, if we
wish to gain insights into why things go wrong with test
results management systems, then there is a need to rec-
ognise that the great majority of harm incidents arise
not from the actions or inactions of individual team
members (or patients), but from the complex sociotech-
nical interactions that take place within the inadequate,
incomplete and often conﬂicted systems of which
people (clinicians and patients) are an integral, inter-
dependent element.10–12 This level of understanding
forms a key safety principle in the discipline of Human
Factors and Ergonomics,10–12 knowledge of which is
limited in healthcare although policy planning in this
area at a national level is now underway.40 Realistically, a
deeper understanding of the basic principles underpin-
ning discipline is arguably necessary if GP teams are to
acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to design safe
and efﬁcient (and resilient) care systems to optimise
performance and eliminate hazards.
Study limitations
A number of limitations are evident with this study.
Although data from a large number of UK and Ireland
practices are included, this is highly likely to be a biased
and potentially unrepresentative group given their self-
selecting membership of MPS, or preparedness to pay a
fee for the CRSA. The lack of practice demographic
data collected meant we could not provide a more
insightful background context to the risks identiﬁed
across different types, sizes and locations of practices
and enabled interpractice and country comparisons.
This would have been useful to inform future quality
improvement and research activity. Although CRSA facil-
itators are trained and accredited, there will still be vari-
ation in how they interview staff and observe and rate
aspects of practice performance, meaning that they may
overestimate or underestimate actual or perceived prac-
tice risks around systems for managing laboratory test
results. The categorisation of study data and design of
the conceptual model was based on evidence from the
perspective of general practice rather than clinical
laboratory-based research, where the types of patient
safety concerns (particularly in the analytical phase) can
be markedly different.41 Similarly, there may be debate
over how we have categorised some the of identiﬁed
hazards (eg, see online supplementary appendix 1—
hazards numbers 13, 19, 31 and 33 were pragmatically
classiﬁed as ‘preanalytical’ for convenience because all
related to some extent to this ﬁrst stage of the process).
It is difﬁcult to determine the signiﬁcance of the risk
posed to patients and practice teams with many of the
hazards identiﬁed in this study. The reality is that raising
awareness of the high frequency of a speciﬁc hazard
occurring may not necessarily lead to it being categorised
as a priority risk by GP teams. For example, the lack of an
adequate tracking system to reconcile tests ordered with
results received may well be recognised as a safety hazard
by the practice leadership, but is not accorded priority
status because of a combination of the effort and
resource involved in resolving the issue and the perceived
risk of harm to patients, that is, the practice is willing to
trade-off the perceived safety risk to patients in favour of
the perceived efﬁciency of their current system.
CONCLUSION
Based on arguably the largest data set currently available
on the subject matter, our study of the MPS’s CRSA pro-
gramme sheds new light on the scale and nature of
hazards related to test results handling systems in
primary care. We need to acknowledge that interven-
tions to reduce patient harm are currently limited due
to lack of research and improvement attention given to
this high-risk area. However, the study outcomes will be
of interest internationally to primary care providers,
researchers, patient safety leaders and policymakers with
an interest in studying the topic with a view to minimis-
ing risks and improving the underlying safety and reli-
ability of such systems.
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